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Ecosystem Services beyond Valuation, 
Regulation, and Philanthropy: Integrating 
Consumer Values into the Economy
Stephen K. Swallow, Elizabeth C. Smith, Emi Uchida and Christopher M. Anderson
JEL Classifications: Q20, Q57, C93, H41 
Ecosystem services have been identified as a central link 
between society, or human systems, and the structure and 
function of natural systems (e.g., U.S. LTER 2007, MEA 
2005). A fundamental economic problem is that while 
almost everyone—environmental groups, policy makers, 
and broad segments of the general public—seems to be-
lieve ecosystem services are valuable, the available public 
policy tools and approaches for private action fall short, 
and often omit, a direct link to the real values of the peo-
ple. If ecosystem services are of economic value, then a 
fundamental challenge concerns how to identify the link 
between ecosystem services and the quality of life of indi-
vidual households, and how to use that link to integrate 
ecosystem service values into the decisions of businesses and 
individuals in society. Given current markets and policies 
decision–makers are unable to recognize the full value of 
services ecosystems provide. What can be done to integrate 
ecosystem service values into the economy? After reviewing 
a fundamental cause for why markets often overlook eco-
system services, and after considering some limitations of 
the often effective approaches of philanthropy and govern-
ment, we consider the potential to leverage experimental 
economics to create and test approaches to integrate values 
at the individual level into markets addressing ecosystem 
services. 
A Fundamental Problem
One daunting frontier for ecosystem services originates 
from the natural character of many services, which sharply 
restricts or prevents the ability of providers to capture a 
return from many, often most, beneficiaries. This is the na-
ture of “public goods” and “fugitive resources.” Both involve 
“nonexclusivity”: providers cannot exclude beneficiaries 
from benefit without payment for the cost of provision. For 
public goods, many people may benefit simultaneously, so 
no one provider (or user–beneficiary) can exclude anyone 
else at any particular moment. An owner of undeveloped 
farm, forest or lake shore often cannot insist on payment 
from the sprawling, urban–fringe residents who value open 
space for aesthetic tranquility; therefore, the landowner has 
little incentive to consider his community’s open space val-
ues in choices about current use of his land. For fugitive 
resources, Nature does not allow a provider to contain and 
control the resource she has provided or protected; rivers 
flow and wildlife migrate across boundaries. A farmer or 
lawn–owner whose fertilizer percolates to the Mississippi 
or Potomac cannot insist on a return from the fishermen 
who would gain from a smaller Gulf Coast dead–zone, or 
from the patrons of oyster bars who seek a Chesapeake 
culture of local shellfish. Moreover, the opportunity for 
every beneficiary to benefit without payment creates the 
incentive to “free ride” or hang back and wait for potential 
providers—or public–spirited philanthropists—to “do the 
right thing” at their own expense, despite their own oppor-
tunity to ride free on others’ generosity.
As a result, the could–be bounty of ecosystem services, 
and the conditions of ecosystem structure and function, of-
ten arise as a residual, left–over after–thought of decisions 
that potential providers make to sustain their livelihoods. 
For example, even conservation–minded farmers must im-
plement practices within the annual, weather–dependent, 
schedule of their business, and society receives fish, wild-
life, open space and water quality that results (or doesn’t 
result).
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Current Solutions
To be sure, we have institutions, pub-
lic policies and private actions under-
way that mitigate the nonexclusive 
nature of Nature’s services. But most 
existing tools remain short on their 
ability to integrate ecosystem services 
into the economy in a manner that 
is fully commensurate with familiar, 
commercially viable products. 
Government authority generates 
land–use and environmental regula-
tions that place enforceable limits on 
the degree to which individuals and 
firms can impose consequences on a 
broader community, such as through 
pollution or use of resources held 
in the public trust, with impacts on 
public health or endangered species. 
Government can also implement in-
centive payments which directly or 
indirectly compensate providers for 
actions to provide for ecosystem ser-
vices, such as through federally fund-
ed conservation reserve or wetland 
reserve programs. It should be noted 
that, as market–based approaches, 
government incentive payments pri-
marily focus on the supply side op-
portunity costs of providers, such as 
compensating farmers who forego 
crop production on land enrolled in a 
conservation reserve. Centrally–guid-
ed incentive payments may reflect po-
litically or bureaucratically attenuated 
demand–side, public values through 
a benefit–cost analysis, but, in this 
article, we discuss the potential to in-
tegrate demand–side values through 
more complete market mechanisms.
Philanthropy, such as through 
wildlife conservation organizations 
or land trusts, can provide comple-
mentary actions. Philanthropists can 
provide payments for ecosystem ser-
vices by, for example, compensating 
ranchers for tolerating wolves or pur-
chasing conservation easements on 
undeveloped farms or forests. Philan-
thropists can stimulate government 
action by offering matching funds 
for taxpayer–approved conservation 
bond–issues or providing some off-
sets for debts of developing countries 
that protect biodiversity. Of course 
philanthropy exists under the shadow 
of incentives for individuals to ride 
free–waiting for some other donor to 
step forward.
Clearly, however, the limitations 
of government and philanthropic ac-
tion may create additional expenses 
or opportunities lost. Philanthropists 
face their dependence on good will of 
donors, and costs to fight free–riding, 
and despite the effectiveness and nim-
bleness that can come from a care-
fully focused mission, philanthropic 
approaches can generate bureaucratic 
costs. Government may be better po-
sitioned to provide a broad approach, 
perhaps including equity consider-
ations, casting a wide umbrella sup-
ported by more stable (if sometimes 
controversial) funding. But govern-
ment’s costs to obtain detailed (lo-
cal–level) information, to safeguard 
public integrity, and to balance po-
litical tensions, can sometimes create 
the agility and efficiency of a bull at 
Tiffany’s china shop. Both may find 
it difficult to focus their mission or 
goals in detailed alignment with the 
interests of a diverse public. 
In contrast, decentralized market 
approaches to provision of valued 
goods and services are respected for 
agility, responsiveness to diverse pref-
erences, and efficiency in directly ag-
gregating consequences of individual 
values and choices into fairly univer-
sal signals of relative scarcity (called 
relative prices). Often supported by a 
coalition of nationally or internation-
ally known, large, commercial firms 
and philanthropic organizations, we 
see nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) developing standards and 
practices for certification of ecosystem 
or natural resource–based products as 
“sustainably produced” through har-
vest and process chains that are en-
vironmentally friendly. The Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC), con-
cerning seafood, and the Forest Stew-
ardship Council (FSC), concerning 
forest products, provide two exam-
ples, and we are witnessing a prolif-
eration of green–marketing efforts—
sometimes supported by third–party 
verification exemplified by MSC or 
FSC eco–labeling—whereby firms 
are recognizing a public demand for 
attention to environmental steward-
ship. While laudable, these efforts tie 
ecosystem services to the consumer’s 
choices among familiar commercial 
products, rather than directly target-
ing the consumer’s value for specified 
ecosystem services. 
Approaches to ecosystem services 
based primarily on a natural–science 
perspective can overlook another sig-
nificant challenge: identification of 
what people value, rather than sim-
ply what scientists currently measure. 
From the human household’s per-
spective, what is the service? Physical 
measures of ecosystem output, such 
as for water quality and quantity, may 
often be salient and intuitive for, say, 
provisioning services like water for 
drinking or irrigation purposes. But 
what about measures linking water 
quality and services of interest for 
recreation? Egan, Herriges, Kling 
and Downing (forthcoming) show 
that individual households, pursuing 
a diverse set of activities, are respon-
sive to a broad suite of water quality 
measures suggested by biologists, but 
careful modeling is needed to link bi-
ological measures through the process 
by which households seek ecosystem 
services and therefore value various 
dimensions of water quality. 
Innovation Addressing Consumer 
Values
Private NGOs, government, and 
academia have stimulated innovative 
work on the valuation of ecosystem 
services. Society’s representatives’ 
need a better understanding of what 
it is that households actually value 
from ecosystems. We need, and are 
pursuing, better methods to measure 
value, and to link available actions to 
restore or sustain ecosystem structure 
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and functions that yield desirable 
ecosystem services. Support for the 
social science of ecosystem services is 
critical to developing effective policies 
supporting the public welfare.
But what is substantially missing 
from the mission of economics relative 
to ecosystem services is work focused 
on integrating values directly into the 
economy, particularly demand–side 
values. Market–based approaches 
that integrate demand–side values 
give the people a direct and imme-
diate voice—an economic voice—to 
indicate whether particular levels of 
or changes in ecosystem services are 
more or less valuable than particular 
levels of or changes in familiar, com-
mercially produced goods.
How can society stimulate the 
integration of demand–side values in 
policies and market–based approach-
es addressing ecosystem services? This 
integration is already done for many 
provisioning services of ecosystems, 
through long established markets 
for food, fiber and natural resource–
based commodities. How can we 
directly attack nonexcludability and 
give beneficiaries an economic voice 
upon which entrepreneurs can cap-
ture a return from enhancement of 
ecosystem services?
Experimental economists are 
increasingly investigating mecha-
nisms that stimulate individuals to 
go beyond baseline donations and to 
transform a higher portion of their 
values into revenues in support of 
public goods. Experimental econo-
mists bring human subjects into a 
controlled laboratory setting to study 
how incentives and rules of exchange 
lead to individual or collective choic-
es and outcomes. In public goods 
experiments, researchers design a set 
of monetary payoffs that individuals 
can earn through their choices, and 
these payoffs simulate the manner in 
which individuals benefit from real 
public goods. For example, working 
agricultural ecosystems might give ru-
ral residents aesthetic pleasure when 
farms provide grassland habitats for 
songbirds; every member of the com-
munity receives a “songbird benefit” 
whenever the habitat is provided, 
regardless of who bore the costs. In 
the laboratory, a group of individuals 
may be asked to pay for provision of 
a group–fund that provides a mon-
etary return to everyone in the group, 
including those members who chose 
not to invest. Since the group–fund 
does not exclude noncontributors 
from benefiting, it comprises an ab-
stract, monetized simulation of a 
public good. 
Such experiments have shown 
that changing the incentives for indi-
viduals to ride free on the contribu-
tions of others can increase the degree 
to which individuals voluntarily pay 
for the cost of a public good and can 
bring their payments into a closer 
correspondence with their own value 
for the good. While practical mecha-
nisms reduce the incentives for indi-
viduals to free–ride, additional effort 
is needed to evaluate and improve the 
degree to which mechanisms balance 
the provision of benefits net of costs. 
Since many people benefit simultane-
ously, an efficient balance of costs and 
benefits occurs when a provider deliv-
ers increments of public good until 
the costs of delivering the last unit 
are just offset by the combined total 
amount that all beneficiaries would 
willingly pay for that increment rath-
er than doing without it. 
 Since different people have differ-
ent values, some may value the public 
good more or less highly than others, 
so a combined total amount may in-
volve different people paying differ-
ent prices. This issue is not surprising; 
obviously with familiar donations 
mechanisms, different people donate 
different amounts. But it means the 
nonexcludable character of some eco-
system services will require entrepre-
neurs to explain the rationale for mar-
ket mechanisms to newcomers from 
the general public. 
Real Markets for Ecosystem 
Services
The insights from economics ex-
periment already offer potential to 
support markets for real ecosystem 
services. Through USDA funding, 
the authors have established an ex-
perimental market in Jamestown, R.I. 
This example shows both promising 
results and significant areas where 
progress requires additional work to 
design and test mechanisms by which 
entrepreneurs could develop ecosys-
tem service markets.
Jamestown is widely regarded for 
supporting conservation of unde-
veloped farm, forest and open space 
and is in the process of completing 
transactions to purchase develop-
ment rights on the last few operating 
farms. However, while setting aside 
development rights may prevent the 
construction of additional residential 
neighborhoods or other developed 
uses, it may still be challenging for 
farmers to maintain farm operations. 
Moreover, changes in the intensity of 
farming, along with rising costs for 
energy or other inputs, push more 
ecosystem services outside the margin 
that farmers can sustain while main-
taining their business.
This applies, for example, to the 
cultural or aesthetic services provided 
by grassland wildlife to residents who 
seek to live in a rural community that 
supports a healthy ecosystem. The 
experimental market centered on sell-
ing, to Jamestown residents, an op-
portunity to protect grassland habi-
tats during the nesting season. This 
product was presented as contracts 
with farmers who agreed to forego 
hay harvesting and restrict grazing 
on 10–acre fields during eight weeks 
from the beginning of May to the be-
ginning of July.
Using insights from laboratory 
experiments, the research design al-
lowed a comparative test of three 
market mechanisms, including one 
intended only to measure potential 
value and two intended to raise rev-
0 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2008 • 23(2) 
enues sufficient to cover the costs of 
a contract. The study created an ex-
perimental (but nonprofit) business 
and advertised under the trade mark 
of the Nature Services Exchange of 
Jamestown, created as a partnership 
of the University of Rhode Island 
and EcoAsset Markets Inc., an inde-
pendent business in Providence, R.I. 
Residents were randomly assigned to 
groups. Each household in a group 
was asked to make a monetary offer 
subject to rules of the market mecha-
nism assigned to that group; offers 
were made by personal check or by 
credit–card authorization. 
The rules for all mechanisms in-
cluded a “provision point,” which 
corresponds to the minimum amount 
of funding that a group must provide 
in order to cover the costs of a pub-
lic good. In Jamestown, the provi-
sion point is linked to the cost of a 
contract with a farmer who agrees to 
omit any harvest of hay on a specified, 
10–acre field during the late–spring 
nesting season for Bobolinks, a grass-
land–nesting bird. Contracts were ne-
gotiated to cover the farmer’s cost to 
replace the loss of feed by foregoing a 
hay harvest and to compensate for ad-
ditional risk and management incon-
venience to manipulate herds around 
the protected field(s). However, the 
provision point is more than a simple 
fundraising goal; rather it also com-
prises an implicit (beneficent) threat 
that a specific, quantified increase 
in the services of a public good will 
not occur unless the group provides 
for its costs. Laboratory experiments 
have shown a money–back–guaran-
tee reinforces the provision point and 
the tie between contributions and the 
specific service offered. The guarantee 
establishes the rule that if funding 
falls short of the provision point, so 
the good is not provided, the fund-
raiser (seller) will not simply redirect 
revenues to other purposes. The provi-
sion point and money–back–guaran-
tee rules reduce the incentives to ride 
free because group members (should) 
realize that the responsibility lies with 
the defined group and no one outside 
the group, so there are limitations on 
the opportunity to wait for others 
to pay. These rules were used in the 
Jamestown experimental market. 
Laboratory experiments have also 
demonstrated that rules to rebate ex-
cess funds to contributors increase 
the offers that individuals will make, 
given their values. Rebates reduce the 
free–riding incentive for individuals 
to hold–back in a strategic effort to 
offer just–the–right–amount rather 
than paying more than was necessary 
after the contributions of others. The 
rebate feature was varied across mech-
anisms tested in Jamestown.
Our “pivotal mechanism” (PM) 
established a full rebate to any indi-
vidual whose offer was not needed 
to meet the provision point for their 
field after all other contributions from 
their group were taken into account. 
This PM creates an incentive for each 
person to view their own contribu-
tion as if it was the last one needed, 
and their decision would make–or–
break the outcome for their group’s 
hayfield. The PM provides incentives 
for individuals to reveal their full will-
ingness to pay to protect a hayfield 
for grassland birds, but it’s advantage 
in measuring value is off–set by the 
practical limitation that very few or 
no individuals will be pivotal in most 
situations, so the PM generally fails to 
raise actual revenues.
Our “proportional rebate” (PR) 
mechanism is one of two we de-
signed to raise revenues. Under the 
PR rules, any funds collected above 
the amount needed to cover the cost 
of a farm contract would be rebated 
to each contributor in proportion to 
their own contribution to the total of 
all contributions from their group. 
In our 2007 market, the second rev-
enue–raising mechanism used the set 
of offers from a group to calculate the 
lowest possible “uniform price” (UP) 
such that everyone who paid would 
receive a rebate of the excess of their 
offer above the UP; anyone who of-
fered to pay less than the UP would 
receive a full refund. Under the UP, 
everyone who pays will pay the same 
price (after their rebate).
The market generated total of-
fers of around $9700, across all three 
mechanisms, with substantial varia-
tion across groups depending upon 
the rules by which excess funds would 
be rebated. Based on laboratory ex-
periments, we expected the PR mech-
anism to come closest to the “full 
value” estimated under the pivotal 
mechanism (PM), and Jamestown’s 
preliminary results support this pre-
diction. While the UP approach was 
expected to, and did, elicit lower 
offers (and lower revenues) from 
groups, in on–going research we are 
investigating the possibility that simi-
lar mechanisms may produce more 
stable revenues year–after–year, as 
compared to PR. In the 2007 mar-
ket, of six hayfields available for bird 
conservation, revenues met the provi-
sion points for three. Initial analysis 
suggests, however, that for about 400 
homes participating there is potential 
value–as revealed under the various 
mechanisms– ranging from $8800 to 
$28,000 to protect a field for grass-
land birds. The on–going challenge 
will be finding better ways to align 
revenues with this potential value.
The Jamestown experience shows 
that, even in the case of a cultural 
or aesthetic ecosystem service, ex-
perimental economic markets might 
prove successful. In Jamestown, all 
three of the fields that were ultimately 
protected would have been harvested 
during the 2007 nesting season had 
the farmers been unable to obtain sup-
port to offset costs to their operation. 
Moreover, other data from this study 
suggests that not only did residents 
value contracts focused on Bobolinks, 
but they may also value contracts that 
help farmers to restore previously 
idled hayfields to a state that provides 
additional habitat and also eliminates 
invasive plants that may be harmful 
to other aesthetically–valued wildlife 
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(like the monarch butterfly). The eco-
system service market may eventually 
enable farmers to expand their opera-
tions with services that Jamestown’s 
exurban residents’ value.
Concluding Observations
Developing mechanisms to enable 
entrepreneurs to leverage consumer 
values may substantially expand the 
potential for market approaches to 
lead to valuable impacts for ecosys-
tem services. Consider for a moment 
the cap–and–trade approaches used 
for air and water pollutants, and cur-
rently under discussion for carbon 
emissions. If market mechanisms 
create a closer alignment between in-
dividual and collective values and in-
centives to support the public good, 
then markets may create an avenue by 
which communities can directly influ-
ence the key choice of the overall cap 
on emissions; individuals and groups 
who value a further reduction in emis-
sions could buy and retire a quantity 
of permits in a manner that effectively 
lowers the overall cap. Markets enable 
private action that can complement 
or improve upon the government, or 
philanthropic, actions already under-
way for ecosystem services.
Here again the Jamestown Bobo-
link market provides an example. After 
seeing a summary of the experimental 
market in Audubon magazine in No-
vember 2007, a community–garden 
club in Grant, Minnesota, contacted 
the authors and developed their own 
entrepreneurial approach to protect 
a hayfield next to their community 
garden. This year their club members 
have rented the hayfield in consider-
ation of grassland birds, illustrating 
that once enabled, entrepreneurship 
can expand to enhance the provi-
sion of ecosystem services in a nimble 
fashion.
Furthermore, research on the 
implementation of ecosystem ser-
vice markets may benefit from inter-
disciplinary teams and inclusion of 
outreach. In Jamestown, farmers’ in-
dependent experimentation is likely 
to yield modifications to contracts, 
such as to plan for early–season graz-
ing, that both enhance farmers’ abil-
ity to deliver ecosystem services and 
lower the costs (or provision points) 
implied. At this writing, Jamestown 
farmers are weighing options to al-
ter grass species in their hayfields, to 
better manage joint production of 
grassland birds and feed for livestock 
(G. Neale, personal communication). 
Moreover, ecological research on bird 
behavior may enable the design of 
methods that allow environmental 
managers to guide birds toward fields 
that are likely to be protected in the 
next season. Such considerations may 
be critical to establishing hayfield har-
vest rotations through a series of years 
that sustain the quality of hayfields 
for both feed production and habitat. 
The field experience also has raised a 
number of questions that were not ap-
parent from a review of experimental 
economics literature alone, including 
questions about which mechanisms 
would produce stable revenues over 
time or be adaptable to situations 
where many increments to ecosystem 
services might be possible. 
The challenge of ecosystem ser-
vices is as complex as the complex-
ity of human and ecological systems 
combined. Ecosystem services link us 
with Nature and progress will often 
require a comprehensive approach 
with disciplinary, interdisciplinary 
and integrated teams on the frontier.
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